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Abstract
This Response to Professors Levin, Jacobs, and Arora’s article
To Accommodate or Not to Accommodate: (When) Should the
State Regulate Religion to Protect the Rights of Children and
Third Parties? focuses on their claim that the law governing
religious exemptions to medical neglect is messy, unprincipled,
and in need of reform, including because it violates the
Establishment Clause. I disagree with this assessment and
provide support for my position. Specifically, I summarize and
assess the current state of this law and its foundation in the
perennial tussle between parental rights and state authority to
make decisions for and about the child. Because these are featured
as examples in their work, I also summarize and assess the
current state of the law on vaccinations and male circumcision. I
conclude with some thoughts on Levin, Jacobs, and Arora’s
provocative suggestion that the law governing religious
exemptions to medical neglect (as reformed according to their
terms) might provide a template for addressing other
accommodation claims such as those of religiously-motivated
opponents of gay marriage.
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I. Introduction
There is no dearth of legal scholarship on the subject of
religiously-motivated medical neglect. Much of that scholarship
focuses on the federal government’s brief insistence in the period
1974 to 1983 that the states provide statutory exemptions to such
neglect, and on the effects of those exemptions even as the
government withdrew its mandate.1 But the best of it transcends
that historical moment and examines the phenomenon in its
broader political and doctrinal context.2 The central question in
this context is generally, who decides for the child who, because of
her infancy, cannot decide for herself? More specifically, who
decides her religion and how she will be treated when she is ill or
injured? Our society’s related commitments to liberalism and
pluralism assure that the answer always starts with her parents;
to the extent scholars have disagreed amongst themselves, it has
only been about how much liberty parents have and should have,
1. See generally, e.g., Wayne F. Malecha, Faith Healing Exemptions to
Child Protection Laws: Keeping the Faith versus Medical Care for Children, 12
J. LEGIS. 243 (1985); Jennifer L. Rosato, Putting Square Pegs in a Round Hole:
Procedural Due Process and the Effect of Faith Healing Exceptions on the
Prosecution of Faith Healing Parents, 29 U.S.F. L. REV. 43 (1994); Rita Swan,
On Statutes Depriving a Class of Children of Rights to Medical Care: Can This
Discrimination Be Litigated?, 2 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 73 (1998); see also infra
note 76 (discussing the statutory and regulatory history).
2. See generally, e.g., SHAWN FRANCIS PETERS, WHEN PRAYER FAILS: FAITH
HEALING, CHILDREN, AND THE LAW (2008); James G. Dwyer, Spiritual Treatment
Exemptions to Child Medical Neglect Laws: What We Outsiders Should Think,
76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 147 (2000); James G. Dwyer, The Children We Abandon:
Religious Exemptions to Child Welfare and Education Laws as Denials of Equal
Protection to Children of Religious Objectors, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1321 (1996);
Walter Wadlington, David C. Baum Memorial Lecture: Medical Decision Making
for and by Children: Tensions Between Parent, State, and Child, 1994 U. ILL. L.
REV. 311 (1994).
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and then about when and on what grounds the state properly
intervenes to replace them as decision makers.
In this respect, Professors Levin, Jacobs, and Arora’s article,
To Accommodate or Not to Accommodate: (When) Should the
State Regulate Religion to Protect the Rights of Children and
Third Parties?,3 is different; it focuses not on the political and
doctrinal boundaries of parents’ liberty—indeed, it is largely
devoid of this discussion—but rather examines the law’s
treatment of religiously-motivated medical neglect as an aspect of
its treatment of religion more generally.4 This take on the subject
from Law and Religion is a welcome addition to a literature that
is otherwise typically bent against accommodations and missing
the intellectual respect and multidisciplinary sophistication the
Authors bring to the table. Their take is also interesting because
it situates parental decision-making about the treatment of
illness and injury within the broader literature on tolerance,5 and
because it highlights how much more carefully religiouslymotivated parents may be accommodated than other religiouslymotivated claimants.6 The perspectives and reflections afforded
3. 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 913 (forthcoming 2016). This Article follows
from Professor Levin’s earlier work, Rethinking Religious Minorities’ Political
Power, 48 U.C.D. L. REV. 1617, 1617 (2015), in which he argues against “the
dominant view . . . that courts are indispensable for protecting religious
minority groups from oppression by the majority”; and from Professor Jacobs
and Arora’s earlier work, Ritual Male Infant Circumcision and Human Rights,
15 AM. J. BIOETHICS 30 (2015).
4. Framed as it is, the Authors’ article is about more than accommodation
of medical neglect, of course. But, as I read it, this is its principal focus. It is also
the area in which I have some expertise and so it is also the focus of this
Response. Throughout, I use the term “medical neglect” both technically, to
describe this particular area of the law which is a sub-set of maltreatment law,
and more generally, to describe the set of fact patterns which are of concern to
the Authors. These include medical neglect cases, but also vaccination cases
(which are neglect in the absence of an exemption) and circumcision cases
(which could theoretically be characterized as maltreatment, but as abuse not
neglect). The Authors themselves speak of “religious practices” and
“accommodations” that “impose health-related harm to children within a
religious group or to third parties.” See, e.g., Levin et al., supra note 3, at 913,
963.
5. See, e.g., Doriane Lambelet Coleman, The Seattle Compromise:
Multicultural Sensitivity and Americanization, 47 DUKE L.J. 717 (1998)
(providing a similar analysis, but with immigrant parenting practices).
6. See, e.g., Levin et al., supra note 3, at 913, 919–45 (supporting their
principal argument—that accommodations law in general is messy and
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by these approaches have the potential to be illuminating and
generative both within and outside of Law and Religion.
The fact that the Authors are interested in bringing theory to
bear on practice, and that they have the tools to do so, is also
welcome. Unfortunately, this aspect of their otherwise promising
project falls short in this case. It falls short because it proceeds
largely without regard to the extensive body of law and
scholarship already on the particular subject of medical neglect,
and because it ignores that parents are special individuals in
American political philosophy and law so that the harm principle
that otherwise governs the outcome of cases involving the limits
on tolerance and religious accommodations reads differently in
this context. The analysis that follows focuses on these two
issues.
Part I summarizes the Authors’ arguments and proposals.
Part II offers a critique from family and children’s law. This
critique is primarily of their doctrinal work, which, I argue,
causes them to assume that current law is different than it is and
in need of reform, when in fact it largely mirrors their proposal.
In the course of developing this point, Part II provides an up-todate survey of the law’s accommodation of religiously-motivated
medical neglect, including religious opposition to vaccination
mandates and the challenge to male circumcision. My Response
concludes with a reflection on the Authors’ suggestion that
medical neglect law may provide a model for evaluating the
merits of other kinds of accommodation claims including those
touching on religious opposition to same sex marriage.
II. To Accommodate or Not
In To Accommodate or Not, the Authors make two principal
arguments and two proposals.
First, they argue that the law that applies when “religious
practices . . . impose health-related harm to children within a
religious group or to third parties” is “inconsistent” and that this
situation exists because “legislators, courts, scholars, ethicists,
unprincipled—with examples that feature the accommodation of religiouslymotivated medical neglect against a backdrop of political and judicial decisions
denying accommodations in other areas).
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and medical practitioners have not offered a consistent way to
analyze” the cases.7 In support of this argument, they summarize
the history of constitutional and statutory “expressions of
accommodationism” in general, emphasizing shifts in degrees of
respect for religiously-motivated conduct over time, across fact
patterns, and depending on the government (federal or state) and
branch of government (primarily judiciary or legislature) doing
the accommodating.8 Notably, this support does not involve an
analysis of medical neglect law.
Second, the Authors argue that this “lack of consistency is a
troubling artifact of our political system” which “raises serious
constitutional questions that lie at the intersection of the Free
Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment.”9
They say they accept that interests balancing—particularly that
which involves a balancing of harms—is appropriate and even
necessary in this area.10 They also say they accept the facts of our
federalism; in their words, that especially in “a multi-ethnic,
multi-cultural, and multi-jurisdictional society such as ours,”
interests balancing will “produce varying policies” since “different
policymakers and communities may balance the interests
differently in specific cases,”11 so that “[d]ifferences in the
accommodation of claims for different sorts of religious
accommodations are not in themselves surprising or necessarily
troubling.”12 But, they insist, “there seem to be no principles at
7. Id. at 913.
8. See generally id. at 919–45 (discussing the accommodation debate from
scholarly, statutory, and constitutional perspectives).
9. Id. at 913–14.
10. Id. at 946 (noting, for example, that “the liberal values that require
society to protect human life and impose an absolute ban on private killings
easily supersede the values favoring individual religious freedom”). For
instance, they accept that “laws that decline to accommodate religious objectors
can be understood as principled efforts to balance the benefits of religious
liberty against its costs.” Id.
11. Id. at 946–47
12. Id. at 945; see also id. at 937 (noting that “[o]ur federalist structure
allows different states to preserve their different characters.”) Unfortunately,
this acknowledgement does not appear to guide the Authors’ analysis going
forward, as much of what they describe as inconsistent in the context of medical
neglect law is in fact the result of federalism. Different states have adopted
different approaches to what have traditionally been state law matters,
including the regulation of the family and of medicine. See infra notes 17, 54,
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play in the degree to which we permit or limit religious freedom
in individual cases,”13 and this is troubling because the First
Amendment demands principled balancing.
Specifically on the point that the law’s approach to religious
accommodations is unprincipled, the Authors point out that
“[s]ometimes we allow religious groups to impose significant costs
and harms on third parties”14 and in other cases “statutes or
regulations prohibit the exercise of religious freedom”15 in
circumstances that exhibit “no regard for the value of religious
liberty despite the absence of documented harm to any
individual.”16
[C]onsider for instance, parents who refuse to vaccinate their
children against deadly diseases for reasons of religion, thus
putting at grave risk both their own children and other
children who cannot be successfully vaccinated. Or consider
parents who are shielded by law from criminal charges when
they withhold necessary medical treatment from their children
for religious reasons. Here we seem to have embraced an
extreme degree of religious liberty that ignores severe harms
to children and third parties.
On the other hand, sometimes statutes or regulations prohibit
the exercise of religious freedom even when there is little or no
harm to anyone. Consider, for example, the plaintiff in
[Employment Division v.] Smith, who wished to use controlled
substances as part of his religious worship ceremonies but was
denied even though the Government could articulate no third
party harms, or even harms to the people who used the drugs
in their rituals.17
74–85 and accompanying text (highlighting the points that struck me in this
regard). I acknowledge that this critique may be misplaced if what the Authors
intended was merely to note that the accommodation of medical neglect
(including vaccination exemptions) is much broader than (and thus inconsistent
with) the accommodation of other religious claims. I took them at their word,
however, that they also see medical neglect law itself as internally inconsistent.
Supra note 7 and accompanying text.
13. Levin et al., supra note 3, at 948.
14. Id. at 948–49.
15. Id. at 949.
16. Id. at 950.
17. Levin et al., supra note 3, at 949 (citing Employment Division v. Smith,
494 U.S. 872 (1990)). The authors also cite Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853 (2015),
which they describe as involving “a prisoner who wished to grow a beard of one
half inch in length to comply with his religious beliefs but was denied for

RELIGIOUSLY-MOTIVATED MEDICAL NEGLECT

365

The Authors explain this inconsistency using “basic insights”
from public choice theory,18 namely that “religious groups operate
in
the
political
marketplace
like
other
interest
groups . . . . [W]hether they win or lose on a particular political
issue is related less to a principled balancing of the competing
underlying values than it is to the political dynamics in play.”19
But, they argue, “we should demand more than ‘politics as usual’
in the context of religious accommodations that potentially harm
children or third parties” because “both sides of the equation
implicate constitutional values.”20
On this constitutional point, the Authors explain their view
that the relationship between the First Amendment’s Free
Exercise and Establishment Clauses requires both that
“individuals and groups not be prevented from practicing their
religious obligations as a result of bias, animus, or stereotyping
on the part of lawmakers and officials” and that accommodations
do not cause harm to “children and third parties . . . who do not
choose to subject themselves to the same religious strictures.”21
reasons so transparently baseless that Supreme Court Justices laughed at
them.” Id.
18. Id. at 950.
19. Id. at 960.
20. Id. at 964. Critiquing this aspect of the Authors’ analysis is not the
focus of my Response, but it bears noting that to support their central premise
that the law’s approach to religious accommodations is inconsistent and
unprincipled, in effect the Authors take an aerial, forest-through-the trees view
of their subject which blurs the law’s essential details. This view assumes away
history, in particular the evolution of the Supreme Court’s fundamental rights
analysis; and it assumes away federalism, the separation of powers, and the
standard relevance of case facts. In other words, the way the Authors propose to
support their claim that the law in this area is “unprincipled” is by assuming
away the very principles that make sense of its apparent messiness. See, e.g.,
supra notes 8, 12, 17 and accompanying text (providing examples of these
erasures). For me, at least, this analytical move is not remedied by the Authors’
alternative story, that the dissatisfactory state of accommodations law can be
explained using public choice theory. Although this story is surely right as to
some accommodations—for example, I agree that religious exemptions to
medical neglect laws are illustrative here—it is ultimately unnecessary because
it does not do any work that is not already done by federalism and separation
powers principles: different jurisdictions sometimes weigh harms differently and
choose different approaches, and the three branches of government within a
jurisdiction sometimes approach the issue differently given their different
sources of authority and responsibilities.
21. Id. at 964. To support this proposition, the Authors cite Levin,
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The Authors offer a three-part test “[t]o resolve these
problems”22 that “balances the competing interests . . . according
to the yin and yang of the First Amendment Free Exercise and
Establishment Clauses.”23 The test is designed “to determine
whether . . . [a] religious practice should be accommodated by
legislators, courts, and medical practitioners.”24 In essence, the
test provides that the government “may restrict” religious
practices that “creat[e] a substantial chance of death or major
disruption of a physiological function or . . . major psychological
morbidity” to in-group members, or that “create[] unreasonable
burdens” to out-group members including to “society as a
whole.”25 It further provides that the government “has a
constitutional obligation to limit the practice” if its effects are
“severe.”26 Finally, it sets out a non-discrimination provision that
would prohibit the government from restricting religious
practices which cause “harms of a similar magnitude” to those of
“tolerate[d] . . . comparable mainstream practices.”27 This same
provision would require the government to restrict religious
Rethinking Religious Minorities’ Political Power, supra note 3. They note that at
page 1655 Levin “discuss[es] the line of cases interpreting the Establishment
Clause to limit the accommodation of religious practices that harm third
parties.” Levin et al., supra note 3, at 964 n.246. But none of the “third parties”
in those cases are children burdened by their parents’ religious practices. See
Levin, supra note 3, at 1655 n.184 (citing only to cases involving impermissible
discrimination among religions and impermissible burdens on third party
outsiders). And the Authors do not explain how they relate to the
constitutionally different factual setting that is the parent-child relationship,
which does not contemplate children as third parties vis à vis their parents. See
infra notes 35–36 and accompanying text (further discussing this point).
22. Levin et al., supra note 3, at 914.
23. Id. at 965.
24. Id. at 914.
25. Id. at 966.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 966–67. The Authors provide infant circumcision as an example
of such a prohibition:
[I]f a society tolerates infant circumcision performed by a doctor in
hospitals for non-religious reasons, it must also tolerate religious
Jews’ practice of home infant circumcision performed by a trained
mohel (Jewish circumciser) unless the risks associated with this
religious practice are of greater magnitude than those associated with
the non-religious practice.
Id. at 989.
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practices that cause severe harms if it prohibits mainstream
practices that cause those harms.28
Finally, with some equivocation,29 and without developing
the point in any real detail,30 the Authors suggest that their
medical neglect test “has potential implications for a wide range
of clashes between law and religion[,]”31 including for “the debate
over whether sexual orientation non-discrimination laws should
accommodate religious dissent.”32
III. A Critique from Family and Children’s Law
The focus of my critique of the Authors’ work from family and
children’s law is both doctrinal and normative. It centers first on
their claims about the Establishment Clause and then on their
claims about the state of medical neglect law. Because their
proposed test is based on these claims, its merits are also
considered. In the process, I provide an up-to-date summary of
the law applicable to religiously-motivated medical neglect.

28. See id. (noting that “society cannot simultaneously tolerate comparable
mainstream practices—religious or not—that impose similar harms”).
29. See id. at 1007 (noting, for example, that “while we do not discount the
possibility that the test could play a guiding role in deciding such cases, the
matter requires further consideration”).
30. The Authors devote approximately two pages to what is ultimately
their most provocative argument, that the medical neglect test might be
extrapolated to the “debate over whether sexual orientation non-discrimination
laws should accommodate religious dissent.” Id. at 914; see also id. at 1006–08
(discussing this argument). In those pages, beyond referring back to their test
and saying that interests balancing would be at issue, they do not detail how
this would work or otherwise discuss the legal and policy implications of this
particular proposed application. See id. at 1008 (discussing only “kinds of
compromises [that] are reasonable attempts to balance the values of pluralism
and religious freedom against those of monism and the protection of the
interests of third parties in a manner compatible with the mandates of the
religion clauses”).
31. Id. at 1006.
32. Id. at 914, 1006–08.
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A. The Establishment Clause and Medical Neglect Law

To the extent the Authors are making doctrinal as opposed to
normative claims, they err in their suggestions that the
Establishment Clause (1) disallows accommodations that would
cause harm to “children . . . who do not choose to subject
themselves to the same religious strictures,”33 and (2) requires
the government affirmatively to intervene to protect children
from serious harm that could result from religiously-motivated
medical neglect.34
As to the former, the law of parental autonomy is clear that,
aside from a few notable exceptions, children do not have the
capacity to make choices of legal consequence, including about
religion and medical treatment; their parents are formally
charged with the right and responsibility to make these decisions
in their place.35 As a result, a child cannot choose legally to
subject themselves or not to particular religious strictures. Their
parents’ choices are formally theirs, meaning their parents’
religion is formally theirs; the law has adopted the legal fiction
that the parents’ choice is the child’s choice. Thus, again
doctrinally-speaking, it is not, as the Authors suggest, a
prohibited establishment of religion for the state to recognize the
33. Id. at 964.
34. Id. at 966.
35. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 58 (2000) (reaffirming the
longstanding constitutional “presumption that fit parents act in their children’s
best interests); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 623 (1979) (establishing parents’
Fourteenth Amendment right to make medical decisions for their children and
describing the best interests presumption and its operation); Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972) (generally describing parents’ rights to
determine their children’s religion and pre-majority lives and the limits of state
authority in those respects); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165–66
(1944) (noting parents’ right to provide children with religious training); Meyer
v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399–400 (1923) (first establishing parental rights,
including “the right of the individual . . . to . . . establish a home and bring up
children” and “to worship God according to the dictates of his conscience,” as
being within the liberty secured by the Fourteenth Amendment); see also
Doriane Lambelet Coleman & Philip M. Rosoff, The Legal Authority of Mature
Minors to Consent to General Medical Treatment, 131 PEDIATRICS 786, 788–89
(Apr. 2013) (summarizing the law of parental autonomy as it relates to medical
decision-making for children, including mature minors); Doriane Lambelet
Coleman, The Legal Ethics of Pediatric Research, 57 DUKE L.J. 517, 545–559
(2007) (describing the boundaries of parents’ consent authority).
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parents’ religion as also being the child’s religion. Indeed, I think
it is fair to say both that because children are not third parties in
the parent-child relationship the Establishment Clause is not at
issue here,36 and that it is unlikely that the Court would seriously
entertain a different interpretation that conflicted with its
parental autonomy jurisprudence.
As to the latter, the law is clear both that the Establishment
Clause permits the government to privilege religion, just not any
particular religion,37 and that it does not contemplate affirmative
action on the government’s part of the sort the Authors imagine.38
36. To the extent the Establishment Clause has been relevant in parents’
rights cases to date, it has tended to be in two categories. The first comprise
cases in which the claim is made that a public school’s actions or requirements
favor or burden a particular religion. See generally, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505
U.S. 577 (1992) (considering a religious sermon at a public school graduation).
The second comprise cases involving religious exemptions to medical neglect
laws, which, as written, appear to privilege Christian Scientists or some other
particular religious group. See, e.g., Walker v. Superior Court, 763 P.2d 852, 875
(Cal. 1988) (Mosk, J., concurring) (“The one group of parents squarely protected
by the terms of the statute are Christian Scientists, whose denomination
sponsored the 1976 amendment to section 270 enacting its religious
exemption.”).
37. See, e.g., Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 717–25 (2004) (noting that the
“play in the joints” between the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses
“permit[s] . . . but [does] not require[]” the states to accommodate religion in an
otherwise neutral context); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1983) (finding
that the Establishment Clause “affirmatively mandates accommodation, not
merely tolerance, of all religions, and forbids hostility toward any”); Larson v.
Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982) (“The clearest command of the Establishment
Clause is that one religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over
another.”).
38. The Authors write that “[t]he Supreme Court has suggested that legal
tolerance or accommodation of religious practices that impose third-party harms
potentially violate the Establishment Clause.” Levin et al., supra note 3 at 991
(citing Levin, Rethinking Religious Minorities’ Political Power, supra note 3, at
1655 (emphasis added). They apparently rely on this in the development of their
medical neglect test, which provides in part that the government “has a
constitutional obligation to limit the practice” if its effects are “severe.” Id. at
966 (citing Levin, Rethinking Religious Minorities’ Political Power, supra note 3,
at 1657). That the government has no federal constitutional obligation
affirmatively to intervene to protect children from parental maltreatment was
specifically established in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social
Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989). Although DeShaney was decided on Fourteenth
Amendment liberty grounds, id. at 203, there is no indication there or elsewhere
that the outcome would have been different had the case arisen instead on First
Amendment Establishment Clause grounds. Apart from the factual points that
make this unlikely—mostly having to do with the public duty doctrine, agency

370

73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 359 (2016)

Most specifically, although there is excellent scholarship on the
point that equal protection doctrine might be marshalled in favor
of a requirement that government treat children of religious
parents as it treats children of non-religious parents,39 neither
the Equal Protection Clause nor the Establishment Clause have
been successfully used toward this end.40 The phenomenon that
results—children of religious parents who are not protected by
the state from suspected maltreatment to the same extent as
children of non-religious parents—is well known amongst
children’s law scholars and lawyers who practice in the field.41 It
is part of the constitutional scheme that has caused scholars to
describe children—in effect pre-autonomous individuals—as “the
Achilles heel of liberalism.”42
Ultimately, the Authors appear to be reading the religion
clauses to include novel or non-traditional anti-discrimination
norms: norms that would erase the distinctions between the
autonomy afforded to (or recognized as existing in) children and
adults, and between religiously- and other-motivated
individuals.43 If I am right to read the work this way, I am both
discretion, and the fisc—there is also a dearth of law on the point that the
Establishment Clause imposes any affirmative obligation on the government
unless it is to remedy an existing violation of the Clause. Cf. Salazar v. Buono,
559 U.S. 700, 750 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the
Establishment Clause may “impose affirmative obligations that may require a
State, in some situations, to take steps to avoid being perceived as supporting or
endorsing a [particular] private religious message”). This is not the case here,
where, consistent with Establishment Clause jurisprudence, the government
has chosen to accommodate religious objections generally. See Lynch, 465 U.S.
at 673.
39. See generally Dwyer, The Children We Abandon, supra note 2 (arguing
that religious exemptions to child welfare laws violate the Equal Protection
Clause).
40. Cf. Brown v. Stone, 378 So.2d 218, 223–24 (Miss. 1979) (holding that
religious exemption to school vaccination requirement would violate equal
protection rights of third-party children).
41. See Doriane Lambelet Coleman, Storming the Castle to Save the
Children: The Ironic Costs of a Child Welfare Exception to the Fourth
Amendment, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 413, 537–38, 538 n.354 (2005) (discussing
this phenomenon).
42. Id. at 421.
43. As I read the Authors’ work, this effort is most evident in the
“magnitude” prong of their medical neglect test. See Levin et al., supra note 3, at
969 (suggesting that accommodations are disallowed where “society has [not]
chosen to permit mainstream practices that are comparable to the religious
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sympathetic and disappointed. I am sympathetic because I would
prefer a Constitution which did not privilege the accommodation
claims of parents who are religiously-motivated—this not because
I do not respect religion but because I respect all sincerely-held
conscience-based claims.44 I am also sympathetic because I would
prefer a Constitution that recognized the right of all children to
be launched into the rest of their lives as individuals and citizens
with healthy, well-developed bodies and minds45—what they
choose to do with those bodies and minds once they are launched
and are unquestionably exercising autonomy, sans proxy, is
finally their own business. I am disappointed because, at least in
this work, the Authors do not develop these ideas. Rather, they

conduct in question and that impose similar harms”). But it also shows in their
earlier Establishment Clause discussion. See, e.g., id. at 964 (arguing that
“religious accommodations that impose harms to children and third parties raise
substantial questions under the Establishment Clause”); id. at 966 (requiring
the government to intervene to protect children of religious minorities from
severe harm if it also protects other children in these circumstances).
44. For example, I agree with what the Court wrote in Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944):
If appellant seeks for freedom of conscience a broader protection than
for freedom of the mind, it may be doubted that any of the great
liberties insured by the First Article can be given higher place than
the others. All have preferred position in our basic scheme. All are
interwoven there together. Differences there are, in them and in the
modes appropriate for their exercise. But they have unity in the
charger’s prime place because they have unity in their human sources
and functionings. Heart and mind are not identical. Intuitive faith
and reasoned judgment are not the same. Spirit is not always
thought. But in the everyday business of living, secular or otherwise,
these variant aspects of personality find inseparable expression in a
thousand ways. They cannot be altogether parted in law more than in
life.
Id. at 164.
45. In this respect too, I am a big fan of Prince and of its famous
admonition: “Parents may be free to become martyrs themselves. But it does not
follow they are free, in identical circumstances, to make martyrs of their
children before they have reached the age of full and legal discretion when they
can make that choice for themselves.” Id. at 170; see generally Doriane Lambelet
Coleman, Individualizing Justice Through Multiculturalism: The Liberals’
Dilemma, 96 COL. L. REV. 1093 (1996) (arguing that the cultural defense to
immigrant crime, including instances in which the latter is religiouslymotivated and as it effects children, is a violation of American antidiscrimination norms). I am not, on the other hand, a fan of the Court’s
application of this law to the Prince facts.
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rest on the claim without more that “the yin and yang” of the
religion clauses somehow requires these readings.46
B. The Law’s Treatment of Religiously-Motivated Medical Neglect
The Authors are undoubtedly correct that religious
exemptions to medical neglect law that result in serious harm are
“bad for children and society at large.”47 Nevertheless, their most
problematic claim is that the law governing such accommodations
is internally messy and unprincipled.48 This claim is problematic
because it lacks relevant support and because, in fact, clear and
principled law does exist in this area. Indeed, their proposed fix
largely replicates that law.
As I note in the Introduction, the Authors chose not to
ground their argument in an analysis of medical neglect law;
instead, they focus on the law governing accommodations in
general. These choices caused them either to miss seeing or
accounting for law that significantly complicates their claim. The
three maltreatment-related accommodation fact patterns they do
discuss—vaccinations,49 circumcision,50 and medical neglect51—
are illustrative.
The United States Supreme Court ruled early on that
vaccination mandates as prophylactic public health measures are
valid exercises of the states’ police powers,52 including as against
claims of parental rights. As the Court famously wrote in Prince
v. Massachusetts, a “parent . . . cannot claim freedom from
46. Levin et al., supra note 3, at 965.
47. Id. at 955; see also id. at 966 (proposing a test to sort permissible from
impermissible accommodations in this context).
48. See supra notes 7–17 and accompanying text (summarizing the
Authors’ arguments in these respects).
49. Levin et al., supra note 3 at 1001–06.
50. Id. at 916, 989. To the extent that male circumcision would qualify as
maltreatment, it would be as medical abuse, not neglect, but I include it here
because the Authors have chosen to use it as an example of an accommodation
that could be analyzed using their proposed medical neglect test. See also supra
note 4 (reconciling the relevant language).
51. Levin et al., supra note 3 at 957.
52. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 39 (1905) (upholding a
state’s right to require vaccination of residents for smallpox).
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compulsory vaccination for the child more than for himself on
religious grounds. The right to practice religion freely does not
include liberty to expose the community nor the child to
communicable disease or the latter to ill health or death.”53
Consistent with this constitutional authority, all states have
enacted vaccination mandates.54 Medical exemptions for
individuals whose immune systems are weak to the point where
vaccination is overly risky were read in almost immediately
everywhere.55 Religious and other conscience-based exemptions
were added later, typically in periods when the diseases at issue
were under control and herd immunity was thought to have been
achieved, so that the accommodations and free riding were
viewed as low cost or even cost free.56 In other words, legislators
have not tended to act in the face of “deadly diseases” or in
circumstances where religious objectors were “putting at grave
risk both their own children and other children who c[ould not] be
successfully vaccinated.”57 The contemporary story is illustrative:
As it has become apparent that some accommodations are no
longer low cost or cost free, policymakers around the country
53. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); see also Zucht v.
King, 260 U.S. 174, 177 (1922) (upholding a state’s right to make vaccination of
schoolchildren mandatory). Notably, the Court recently denied certiorari in
Phillips v. City of New York, 775 F.3d 538 (2d Cir. 2015), a hard-fought case
which would have had it revisit its decisions in Jacobson and Zucht. Phillips v.
City of New York, 136 S.Ct. 104 (2015). See also generally Erwin Chemerinsky
and Michele Goodwin, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 589 (2016) (setting out the history of
compulsory vaccination laws and emphasizing their constitutionality).
54. Vaccination Exemptions, HISTORY OF VACCINES (Jan. 27, 2016),
http://www.historyofvaccines.org/content/articles/vaccination-exemptions
(last
visited July 16, 2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see
also generally JARED P. COLE & KATHLEEN S. SWENDIMAN, CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH SERVICE, MANDATORY VACCINATIONS: PRECEDENT AND CURRENT LAWS
(May 21, 2014) https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS21414.pdf (providing an
overview of mandatory vaccination laws).
55. See Vaccination Exemptions, supra note 54; see also Jacobson v.
Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 38–39 (1905) (suggesting this exception in dicta).
56. See Kevin M. Malone and Alan R. Hinman, Vaccination Mandates: The
Public Health Imperative and Individual Rights, in LAW IN PUBLIC HEALTH
PRACTICE 262–63 (Richard A. Goodman et al. eds., 2009) (explaining the concept
of herd immunity and the low cost of free riding where herd immunity has been
achieved); id. at 273–80 (providing a history and analysis of religious
exemptions to vaccination requirements); id. at 271 (providing a brief history of
the use of schools as the vehicle to achieve herd immunity).
57. Levin et al., supra note 3, at 949.
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have advocated for new restrictions consistent with these
developments,58 and there is some indication that administrators
on the ground are interpreting their authority to restrict existing
accommodations more broadly.59 The result has been a reduced
incidence of disease.60 The effects of federalism aside,61 this is
clearly not a messy story, nor is it an unprincipled one.
In fact, although it is neither uniform nor unfailing, in
general vaccination law’s accommodation of religion in contexts
where harm is unlikely, and its efforts to restrict accommodations
in contexts where the risk of harm is heightened, is entirely
58. See, e.g., Sarah Breitenbach, Here’s Why States Want to Make it Tough
to Skip Childhood Vaccines, PBS NEWSHOUR: THE RUNDOWN (May 25, 2016),
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/heres-why-states-want-to-make-it-toughto-skip-childhood-vaccines/ (last visited July 16, 2016) (noting the current public
policy push to eliminate religious and philosophical exemptions to vaccination
requirements) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Saerom Yoo,
Oregon One of Many States Seeking Tougher Vaccine Laws, STATESMAN J. (Mar.
13,
2015),
http://www.statesmanjournal.com/story/news/health/2015/03/14/oregon-onemany-states-seeking-tougher-vaccine-laws/70317498/ (last visited July 16, 2016)
(noting in 2015 that “15 states have introduced policies that would strengthen
their school immunization requirements” and that “trends in statehouses across
the country sow a motivation to clamp down on nonmedical exemptions”) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
59. See, e.g., Phillips v. City of New York, 775 F.3d 538, 541 (2d Cir. 2015)
(noting that a state department of education official inquired into the sincerity
of a mother’s religious opposition to vaccination and ultimately denied her
request for an exemption on that basis).
60. See, e.g., Measles Cases and Outbreaks, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND
PREVENTION (June 1, 2016), http://www.cdc.gov/measles/cases-outbreaks.html
(last visited July 16, 2016) (providing a summary of the incidence of measles
outbreaks in the United States from 2010 through approximately the first half
of 2016, as these were connected with vaccination rates, and noting that in the
first five months of 2016 there were 19 cases of measles as compared with a high
of 667 in 2014) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Liz Szabo,
California Governor Signs Strict Law Requiring Vaccination for Most Kids, USA
TODAY
(June
30,
2015),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2015/06/30/california-vaccinebill/29485063/ (last visited July 16, 2016) (noting California’s decision to
eliminate religious and personal exemptions following measles outbreak and
providing data on rate of disease relative to herd immunity depending on state
of the law) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
61. Federalism itself makes law messy, of course, and vaccination law is no
exception. See supra note 55 (providing references to the states’ vaccination
laws). The Authors affirm that the resulting inconsistencies are not what
concern them. See Levin et al., supra note 3, at 961 (noting that “the law does,
indeed must, tolerate all kinds of inconsistencies”).
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consistent with the Authors’ overall approach and with their
specific proposal that the government restrict practices that
cause serious harm to in-group members or place unreasonable
burdens on out-group members.62
Male circumcision is governed by state law, and no state has
yet prohibited the practice; it is legal without an accommodation
everywhere in the country. Specifically, circumcision has long
been considered to be a medical procedure whose benefits
outweigh its inherent harms,63 and thus there has been no need
for the law to develop an exception to abuse definitions for
religiously-motivated parents. Given this, I am assuming that the
Authors’ interest in the issue stems from the fact that the
longstanding medical consensus has wavered in recent years,64
and, as a result, the propriety of the procedure is increasingly
subject to challenge. Although this challenge currently takes
place on the cultural, academic, and ethical fronts65—the latter of
which is of special importance to Professors Jacobs and Aurora,
who are academic physicians and have written separately on the
subject—it does suggest that legal actors might also need
eventually to consider whether to accommodate parents who are
62. Levin et al., supra note 3, at 966.
63. See, e.g., Mike Stobbe, Circumcision Benefits Outweigh the Risk, CDC
Says,
TODAY
HEALTH
&
WELLNESS
(Dec.
2,
2014),
http://www.today.com/health/circumcision-benefits-outweigh-risks-cdc-says1D80331010 (last visited July 16, 2016) (describing this history and reaffirming
the general consensus) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
64. See id. (noting the growing “opposition from anti-circumcision advocacy
groups”); see also Jacobs & Arora, Ritual Male Infant Circumcision, supra note
3, at 30–31 (describing and countering medically and ethically-based opposition
to male infant circumcision); Peter W. Adler, Is Circumcision Legal?, 16 RICH.
J.L. & PUB. INT. 439, 442 (2013) (noting the shifting positions of the American
Academy of Pediatrics and of “[s]ome foreign medical associations”).
65. See, e.g., Chris Silva, To Circumcise or Not to Circumcise: A New
Father’s
Question,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Mar.
1,
2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/04/fashion/mens-style/circumcision-fatherhooddilemma.html?_r=0 (last visited July 16, 2016) (examining current cultural
norms around circumcision) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review);
Jacobs & Arora, supra note 3, at 30 (noting that academic “[o]pponents of male
circumcision have increasingly used human rights positions to articulate their
viewpoint”); Adler, supra note 65, at 443 (examining ethics of non-therapeutic
circumcisions); British Medical Association, The Law and Ethics of Male
Circumcision: Guidance for Doctors, 30 J. MED. ETHICS 259, 259–62 (2004)
(summarizing non-therapeutic circumcision practices).
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religiously (as opposed to medically or culturally) motivated.66 A
discussion of this eventuality is beyond the scope of this
Response. However, the Authors are certainly right that the
discussion should include consideration of both the physical
harm, pain, and injury at issue, and the extent to which these
consequences are accommodated in other contexts so that any
determination of circumcision’s legal status is equitable.67 To this
66. This possibility seemed more realistic from 2007 to 2012, the period in
which the American Academy of Pediatrics was reviewing the evidence in favor
of and against circumcision, and in 2012, when it issued what some considered
to be a “lukewarm” continued endorsement of the procedure. See American
Academy of Pediatrics, Task Force on Circumcision, Circumcision Policy
Statement,
130
PEDIATRICS
585,
585
(2012),
available
at
http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content/130/3/585
(“Although
health
benefits are not great enough to recommend routine circumcision for all male
newborns, the benefits of circumcision are sufficient to justify access to this
procedure for families choosing it and to warrant third-party payment for
circumcision of male newborns.”); see also, e.g., Shawnee Barton, The
Circumcision Wars: What’s a Parent to Do?, ATLANTIC (July 29, 2013),
http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2013/07/the-circumcision-warswhats-a-parent-to-do/278155/ (last visited July 16, 2016) (describing the AAP’s
endorsement as “lukewarm”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review). It was in this period that anti-circumcision activists in California
garnered support for ballot measures that would ban circumcisions in some
localities. Jennifer Medina, Efforts to Ban Circumcision Gain Traction in
California,
N.Y.
TIMES
(June
4,
2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/05/us/05circumcision.html?_r=0 (last visited
July 16, 2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). The CDC’s
2014 affirmation of the historical consensus, see supra note 63 (discussing this
affirmation), together with the traditional deference the law gives to parents to
make medical decisions for their children within the range of reasonableness,
see supra note 35 (discussing Supreme Court precedents upholding the rights of
parents to make reasonable medical decisions), makes it unlikely that any state
in this period would seek to prohibit standard forms of the practice. See, e.g.,
Gov. Brown Signs Bill to Prevent Male Circumcision Bans in California, CBS
SFBAYAREA (Oct. 2, 2011), http://sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com/2011/10/02/governorbrown-signs-bill-to-prevent-male-circumcision-bans-in-california/ (last visited
July 9, 2016) (reporting that the Governor’s action was based in the state’s
authority to regulate medical practice and to protect religious liberty) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
67. Levin et al., supra note 3, at 966–67 (proposing the Authors’ test). In
their earlier work, Jacobs and Arora suggest that comparisons should be made
to accommodations for commonly accepted physical risk-taking and bodily injury
such as participation in contact sports, elective aesthetic surgery, growth
hormone, and ear piercing. Jacobs & Arora, supra note 3, at 36. I agree with this
analysis. See Coleman, The Legal Ethics of Pediatric Research, supra note 35, at
555 (describing religiously-motivated circumcision and these other practices as
“de facto exceptions” to child maltreatment laws).

RELIGIOUSLY-MOTIVATED MEDICAL NEGLECT

377

I would add consideration of parental motivation. Although this
is not doctrinally required, as a normative matter, it would make
sense to ensure that the objective of the procedure was in the best
interests of the child.68 Again, however, there is nothing about the
legal story to date that is messy or unprincipled.69
Medical neglect law is more complicated and thus it is not so
easily summarized. In this respect, it might be described as
messier than vaccination and circumcision law. On the other
hand, like these, it is also generally consistent and principled,
including in the Authors’ sense of the word. And with one
exception,70 its terms generally mirror the Authors’ proposal for
legal reform.
The federal government and all of the states include medical
neglect in their definitions of neglect.71 Medical neglect is
typically defined as the failure to provide the child with necessary
or adequate medical treatment, and as with all other forms of
maltreatment, state intervention in the family to protect the child
is authorized when the child has suffered or is at risk of suffering
serious or life-threatening illness or injury as a result.72
68. See Coleman, The Legal Ethics of Pediatric Research, supra note 35, at
545–52 (describing the boundaries of parents’ consent authority, the best
interests presumption, and the physical abuse standard).
69. The Authors flag “female genital alteration” as an issue in their
introduction. Levin et al., supra note 3, at 916–17. They do not, however, discuss
the relevant law, aspects of which could be considered messy and unprincipled.
See generally Coleman, The Seattle Compromise, supra note 5 (discussing the
practice and the legal reaction to it in the United States).
70. See supra notes 34–46 and accompanying text (discussing the Authors’
argument that the Establishment Clause imposes an obligation on the
government to act affirmatively to protect children from serious harm, and the
expression of this argument in their proposed test).
71. See Definitions of Abuse and Neglect in Federal Law, CHILD WELFARE
INFO. GATEWAY, https://www.childwelfare.gov/topics/can/defining/federal/ (last
visited June 24, 2016) (providing federal definitions of abuse and neglect) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION
GATEWAY, DEFINITIONS OF ABUSE AND NEGLECT IN STATE LAW 2 (2014)
[hereinafter
ABUSE
AND
NEGLECT
IN
STATE
LAW],
https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/define.pdf#page=2&view=Types%20of%2
0abuse (setting out the states’ definitions of abuse and neglect).
72. See generally ABUSE AND NEGLECT IN STATE LAW, supra note 71
(providing state definitions of medical neglect). This standard for medical
interventions in particular pre-dates CAPTA and is a significant feature of the
traditional common law. See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166–
167 (1944) (noting that “[t]he right to practice religion freely does not include

378

73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 359 (2016)

Consistent with the applicable federal mandate, all jurisdictions
require reporting, investigation, and intervention in the family to
protect children who are believed to be medically neglected or at
risk of such.73
Religious exemptions are commonly found in state statutes.74
Unfortunately, the Authors mischaracterize the motivation
underlying their adoption, and this causes them to misstate the
scope of the exemptions’ effect. Specifically, it was not that
“[s]tate legislatures . . . treated [religiously-motivated medical
neglect] with astonishing solicitude,”75 but rather, as I note in the
Introduction, that state legislatures were required by the federal
government to include exemptions in their codes as a condition
for receiving federal funds under the Child Prevention and
Treatment Act of 1974 (CAPTA).76 Although this requirement
liberty to expose . . . the child . . . to ill health or death”); State v. Perricone, 181
A.2d 751, 760 (N.J. 1962) (upholding the right of the state to appoint a guardian
to authorize necessary blood transfusions for a child against the wishes of his
Jehovah’s Witness parents); cf. In re Green, 292 A.2d 387, 390 (Penn. 1972)
(summarizing the case law in the area and holding that the state’s interest does
not override parental rights “when the child’s life is in no immediate danger”).
73. See ABUSE AND NEGLECT IN STATE LAW, supra note 71, at 3 (setting out
reporting requirements).
74. See generally Religious Exemptions to Medical Treatment of Children
in
State
Civil
and
Criminal
Codes,
CHILD,
INC.,
http://childrenshealthcare.org/?page_id=24#Exemptions [hereinafter CHILD,
INC.] (last visited June 24, 2016) (providing up-to-date information on applicable
state and federal laws) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
75. Levin et al., supra note 3, at 994 (noting also that the wide adoption of
exemptions signifies that “virtually every state legislature has decided to accept
greater risk to the health and life of children of religious parents”).
76. See supra note 1 and accompanying text (introducing the federal
mandate). The Child Prevention and Treatment Act of 1974 (CAPTA) requires
states receiving federal funds to protect children from maltreatment including
from neglect. Pub. L. No. 93-247, 88 Stat. 4 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§
5101–5119c (2003)). In 1975, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
(HEW) issued a regulation further conditioning the receipt of federal funds on
the adoption of a religious exemption providing as follows:
A parent or guardian legitimately practicing his religious beliefs who
thereby does not provide specific medical treatment for a child for
that reason alone shall not be considered a negligent parent or
guardian; however, such an exception shall not preclude a court from
ordering that medical services be provided to the child where his
health requires it.
45 C.F.R. § 1340.1-2(b)(1) (1975). This mandate was rescinded in 1983. Child
Abuse and Neglect Prevention Treatment Program, Final Rule, 48 Fed. Reg.
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was withdrawn in 1983,77 only a few states have gone through the
reverse legislative process necessary to get their exemptions off
the books. The states that retain them apparently do so for
reasons ranging from an affirmative ideological or political
commitment to the exemptions’ terms78—which is consistent with
the Authors’ original suggestion—to inertia in the wake of both
legislative and judicial qualifications and nullifications—which is
not.79
Where exemptions exist, they are contained in the civil code,
the criminal code, or both; and, as the Authors note, they
typically provide that parents cannot be held responsible for
neglect solely on the basis that they have chosen to treat their
children’s injuries and illnesses with prayer or other form of
spiritual treatment.80 Consistent with the fact that most
exemptions were enacted pursuant to federal mandate and not
solicitude at the local level, and with the fact that the mandate
3698–3704 (1983); see also Swan, supra note 1, at 58–61 (summarizing the
history of the federal mandate); Maleka, supra note 1, at 246 (noting that most
of the exemptions were enacted in response to [HEW] regulations”). Professor
Levin recognizes this point in his earlier work, but then (as the Authors do here)
he describes the states’ reaction as “astonishing solicitude . . . toward religious
groups and individuals” rather than as the expected response to a federal
mandate. Levin, Rethinking Religious Minorities’ Political Power, supra note 3,
at 1654. More generally, Levin makes a good case in that earlier work that the
majoritarian branches of government have been more solicitous in this area
than the courts; however, as I describe here, there is also a lot of evidence to the
contrary that complicates his story. See 45 C.F.R. § 1340.1-2(b)(1) (providing the
exception in the federal regulation); infra notes 82–83 and accompanying text
(noting the exceptions to the exemptions in related state statutes).
77. See generally HHS Historical Highlights, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND
HUM.
SERVS.
(Aug.
22,
2014),
http://www.hhs.gov/about/historicalhighlights/index.html (last visited July 9, 2016) (noting this milestone) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
78. A few states fall into this category. See CHILD, INC., supra note 74
(noting that Arkansas, Idaho, Iowa, Ohio, and West Virginia stand out in this
respect).
79. Most states fall into this category. See infra note 82–83 and
accompanying text (surveying the states and their exceptions to the
exemptions). In between are states where political battles have been fought over
the repeal of the exemptions. See PETERS, supra note 2, at 15–18 (describing
these battles).
80. See supra note 76 (setting out the relevant part of the regulation);
Levin et al., supra note 3, at 79 (describing the standard exemption); see also
Swan, supra note 1, at 80–82 (providing examples of different state statutes,
including their locations in the code and limitations).
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itself included the condition that the exemptions “shall not
preclude a court from ordering that medical services be provided
to the child where his health requires it,”81 they typically do not
prevent Child Protective Services (CPS) and the courts from
acting to protect children who are believed to have been medically
neglected or who are at risk of such, especially when the
children’s circumstances are emergent and life threatening.82 In
some states this important qualification is set out as it was in the
federal regulation: as an exception to the exemption in the code
itself.83 In others it has been read in by courts interpreting the
81. 45 C.F.R. § 1340.1-2(b)(1) (1975).
82. Importantly, they also typically do not insulate others who are not
parents from their legal obligations to report and investigate suspected medical
neglect. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 626.556 (2015) (providing that the exemption
does not alter mandated reporters’—including parents’—duty to report “if a lack
of medical care may cause serious danger to the child’s health”); Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 210.115 (2015) (providing that exemption does not alter the state’s authority to
“accept reports concerning such a child and may subsequently investigate or
conduct a family assessment as a result of that report”); see also generally ABUSE
AND NEGLECT IN STATE LAW, supra note 71, at 4 (noting that although a majority
of state statutes include a religious exemption in their reporting requirement,
the provisions’ caveats and conditions mean that, in effect, fewer than a
majority of states absolve mandated reporters of their obligations in this
context).
83. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-14-7.2 (2015) (providing that the exemption
“shall not preclude a court from ordering that medical services be provided to
the child when the child’s heath requires it”); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-3-103 (2015)
(“[T]he religious rights of a parent, guardian, or legal custodian shall not limit
access of a child to medical care in a life threatening situation or when the
condition will result in serious disability”); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.01 (2015)
(“[The] exception does not: 1. Eliminate the requirement that such a case be
reported to the department; 2. Prevent the department from investigating such
a case; or 3. Preclude a court from ordering, when the health of the child
requires it . . . .”); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-107.R49-5-180 (2015) (providing the
same language as Colorado’s statute); IOWA CODE § 232.68 (2015) (providing the
same language as Alabama’s statute); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 600.020 (providing
that the exemption “shall not preclude a court from ordering necessary medical
services for a child”); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. ART. § 603 (2014) (providing that the
exemption does not “prohibit the court from ordering medical services for the
child when there is substantial risk of harm to the child’s health or welfare”);
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.634 (2015) (providing that the exemption “shall not
preclude a court from ordering the provision of medical services or nonmedical
remedial services recognized by state law to a child where the child’s health
requires it nor does it abrogate the responsibility of a person required to report
child abuse or neglect”); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.556 (2016) (providing that,
notwithstanding exemption, “if lack of medical care may result in serious danger
to the child’s health, the local welfare agency may ensure that necessary
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exemption’s “solely” or “that reason alone” language,84 or results
from judicial decisions finding the exemptions inapplicable or
medical services are provided to the child”); MO. REV. STAT. § 210.115 (2015)
(providing that the exemption does not alter the state’s authority to “accept
reports concerning such a child and may subsequently investigate or conduct a
family assessment as a result of that report” or “to ensure that medical services
are provided to the child when the child’s heath requires it”); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 41-3-102 (2015) (providing that the exemption “may not be construed to limit
the administrative or judicial authority of the state to ensure that medical care
is provided to the child when there is imminent substantial risk of serious harm
to the child”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.03 (2014)
providing that the exemption “does not abrogate or limit any person’s
responsibility . . . to report . . . child neglect that is known or
reasonably suspected or believed to have occurred, and children who
are known to face or are reasonably suspected or believed to be facing
a threat of suffering . . . neglect and does not preclude any exercise of
the authority of the state, any political subdivision, or any court to
ensure that medical or surgical care or treatment is provided to a
child when the child’s health requires the provision of medical or
surgical care or treatment”
OKLA. STAT. ANN. 10A § 1-1-105 (2016) (providing that the exemption does not
“prevent a court from immediately assuming custody of a child and ordering
whatever action may be necessary, including medical treatment, to protect the
child’s health or welfare”); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6304 (2014) (providing
that, where exemption applies, the “county agency shall closely monitor the
child and the child’s family and shall seek court-ordered medical intervention
when the lack of medical or surgical care threatens the child’s life or long-term
health”); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 11-9-5 (2015) (providing that the exemption does
not “preclude the court from ordering medical services or nonmedical services
recognized by the laws of this state to be provided to the child where his or her
health requires it”); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.981 (2015) (providing the same
language as Alabama’s exemption).
84. See, e.g., Walker v. Superior Court, 763 P.2d 852, 852 (Cal. 1988)
(holding that “child welfare statutes providing that children receiving treatment
by prayer shall not ‘for that reason alone’ be considered abused or neglected did
not evince legislative sanction for prayer treatment of children in lifethreatening circumstances”); In re Eric B., 235 Cal. Rptr. 22, 27–28 (Cal. App.
3d 1987), which held that “[t]he purpose of [the exemption] appears to be rather
limited,” that “[i]t simply identifies one factor to be considered by the juvenile
court,” and that
[i]t clearly does not preclude the court, exercising its ‘very extensive
discretion in determining what will be in the best interests of a child’
from concluding that spiritual treatment alone is not sufficient to
arrest a danger which otherwise requires that dependency be
declared in order that the minor can receive conventional medical
treatment deemed more likely to succeed.
Id.; People in Interest of D.L.E., 645 P.2d 271, 274 (Colo. 1982) (“[T]he meaning
of the statutory language, ‘for that reason alone,’ is quite clear. It allows a
finding of dependency and neglect for other reasons,’ such as where the child’s
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invalid on other grounds.85 Either way, the effect is that the
longstanding common law rule typically continues to operate:
even in jurisdictions with exemptions, the state still can
intervene in the family to protect children from medical neglect
that causes or risks serious illness or injury.86
To be clear, this does not mean that accommodations are
ineffective or innocuous. Many children have died or suffered
serious injury as a result of religiously-motivated medical
neglect.87 The law is not the direct cause of these harms, of
course; but it has surely served and surely continues to serve a
powerful expressive function that lends indirect support to
religiously-motivated parents’ practices, even when these
formally cross the line from legal to illegal.
In general, this is because parents’ Fourteenth Amendment
liberty, which is already quite significant, is enhanced when it is
religiously motivated.88 This is simultaneously a reflection and
life is in imminent danger despite any treatment by spiritual means.”)
85. See, e.g., Newmark v. Williams, 588 A.2d 1108, 1114 (Del. 1991)
(applying the best interests balancing test to determine whether the state could
force Christian Scientist parents to accept medical treatment for a child with
cancer because of concerns that the statutory exemption violated the
Establishment Clause).
86. See supra note 72 (discussing the states’ ability to intervene in
exemption cases). For example, hospitals still routinely act to assure that
Jehovah’s Witness children receive life-saving blood transfusions. See, e.g.,
Niebla v. San Diego, 967 F.2d 589 (9th Cir. 1992) (rejecting the argument that
giving a child a necessary blood transfusion despite the parents’ objection
violates the parents’ constitutional rights); In re Elisha McCauley, 565 N.E.2d
411 (Mass. 1991) (same); J.V. v. State, 516 So.2d 1133 (Fla. App. 1987) (same).
And CPS still routinely acts on reports that Christian Scientist children and
children of other religious minorities are not receiving life-saving medical care.
See, e.g., In re Eric B., 235 Cal. Rptr. at 23 (rejecting argument that requiring
parents to follow physician’s cancer treatment recommendations violated
parents’ religious freedom); In re Pamela Hamilton, 657 S.W.2d 425 (Tenn.
1983) (holding that child’s right to cancer treatment outweighs father’s free
exercise right); see also People in Interest of D. L. E., 645 P.2d 271 (Colo. 1982)
(holding that state can intervene to protect a child whose “life is in imminent
danger” as a result of parent’s refusal to provide conventional medical treatment
on religious grounds).
87. See PETERS, supra note 2, at 11–14 (discussing this history).
88. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215–16 (1972) (noting this point
in the context of Amish parents’ First and Fourteenth Amendment claims);
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 164–65 (1945) (noting this point in the
context of a Jehovah’s Witness guardian’s First and Fourteenth Amendment
claims).

RELIGIOUSLY-MOTIVATED MEDICAL NEGLECT

383

reinforcement of important political and cultural norms about
parental autonomy, and in particular about the relative rights of
religiously- and other-motivated parents to raise their children as
they see fit without state intervention. As a result, many
mandated reporters, CPS, and courts exercising lawful discretion
are likely to be more sensitive about whether and how to intrude
in the family to protect a child who is believed to have suffered or
to be at risk of suffering religiously-motivated medical neglect.
Sometimes not enough may be done to protect children in these
circumstances because—even as it draws a formal line at serious
and certainly life-threatening neglect—the law sends a
particularly strong message about the sanctity of religious
families.
Where they exist, statutory exemptions both reinforce this
general message and provide important specificity which is
missing from the definitive source: they signal that even in the
absence of a Supreme Court free exercise decision on point, at
least statutorily parental liberty to raise one’s child in one’s
religion does include the right to choose spiritual treatment for
illness and injury.89 Notwithstanding the limitations built into
this right,90 some prosecutors, judges, and juries have had
difficulty finding parents criminally blameworthy or subjecting
them to incarceration for the harm that their religious
(objectively good) intentions caused their children.91 Although
state actors do not typically hesitate to intervene in a family to
protect an at-risk child and to supervise the family following a
child’s death in this context,92 to the extent that criminal

89. As the Authors argue, this is an example of “[t]he majoritarian
branches of government . . . go[ing] far beyond what the Supreme Court has
required in accommodating religious freedom.” Levin et al., supra note 3, at 940;
see also Levin, Rethinking Religious Minorities’ Political Power, supra note 3, at
1654 (“These accommodations are wholly the creature of statute. In neither the
vaccination nor the medical treatment context have the federal courts
interpreted the Constitution to require such accommodations . . . .”).
90. See supra notes 83–84 and accompanying text (discussing and citing to
exceptions to the exemptions).
91. See, e.g., PETERS, supra note 2, at 3–14 (describing the facts and
proceedings in the Heilmans case as an illustration of this phenomenon and
detailing the difficulties inherent in prosecuting these cases generally).
92. See, e.g., id. at 8 (providing a poignant illustration of this tendency).

384

73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 359 (2016)

sanctions express the community’s special moral outrage, they
may be missing as a result the exemptions.93
It is not clear that the Authors would have it differently.
They share the law’s commitments to accommodations so long as
the state lacks evidence that a child is suffering or at risk of
suffering serious harm, and to intervention in the family to
protect the child where such evidence exists. And although they
appear concerned that parents who have avoided discovery until
it is too late may not always be successfully prosecuted or
incarcerated, their proposal for reform focuses—as current law
does—on protecting children not punishing parents. There are
excellent arguments on both sides of this issue,94 but to me, at
least, this focus makes sense. Punishing parents may have some
indirect and incremental effect on child protection.95 However,
the prosecutions are complicated and also politically fraught,96
and they risk different harm to the family’s remaining children,
many if not most of whom are likely to be better off if their
parents are supervised but not in jail.97 Finally, although ongoing
supervision is not as attention-grabbing as a prosecution, this
strategy is not without its own expressive power.
IV. Conclusion
In the end, the Authors suggest that their approach to
medical neglect cases may provide a useful template for resolving
questions about the propriety of accommodations in other
contexts. For example, they suggest that it might apply to “the
debate over whether sexual orientation non-discrimination laws
93. See id. at 14 (discussing advocates Rita Swan and Seth Asser’s
“insist[ence] that dozens of lives would be saved every year if local authorities
zealously and consistently enforced criminal neglect, manslaughter, and
criminally negligent homicide statutes against spiritual healers”).
94. See id.
95. See id.
96. See id. at 14–18.
97. See generally Michael Wald, Intervention on Behalf of “Neglected”
Children: A Search for Realistic Standards, 27 STAN. L. REV. 985 (1975) (arguing
that state intervention on behalf of maltreated children also causes harm that
must be balanced against their parents’ actions as decisions are made about
their continuing care).
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should accommodate religious dissent.”98 Although they do not
develop this particular application, they are generally thoughtful
in their consideration of both the merits and limitations of future
extrapolations. To these careful considerations I suggest the
following additional caveat.
The Authors’ template is based on a premise, which holds
that “a religious practice that imposes significant costs or harms
on participants in the practice or on third parties should not be
tolerated, but that in the absence of such harm, we should be
entirely accommodating of religious minorities’ deviations from
general social and legal expectations.”99 They call this “American
baseline accommodationism,” and they characterize it as
“noncontroversial.”100 As applied to medical neglect cases, this
baseline premise results in “a default rule that religious practices
should be respected unless they unduly interfere with the real
and measurable interests of children within the religion and
others outside the religious group.”101 As I have described,
medical neglect law generally reflects the Authors’ proposed rule
in these respects.
The Authors’ take on what medical neglect law should be,
and why, makes sense as a matter of principle because the parties
at issue are parents who are presumed to be acting in their
children’s best interests, their children who are viewed in law as
being one with their parents, and the state which has authority
to intervene in the parent-child relationship only when it appears
that the best interests presumption may be rebutted. This same
take makes a lot less sense—indeed, I would argue none at all—
in circumstances where there is no similar operative
presumption; this includes situations where third parties and
constitutionally significant harms are at issue.
Thus, although the Authors are correct that certain
measures featured in their test—including direct effects, indirect
effects, and magnitude—are applicable beyond medical neglect,
as a matter of different principle the test used to determine when
98. Levin et al., supra note 3, at 913; see also id. at 1007 (discussing the
harms of sexual orientation non-discrimination laws).
99. Id. at 947.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 966.
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the best interests presumption is overcome so that the state can
recognize the child as having separate, protectable interests
should not be the test used to determine when the state can
recognize and protect the constitutional rights of autonomous
individuals—such as the religiously-motivated and same-sex
couples—who stand as equals in the first instance. Children may
be “the Achilles heel of liberalism,”102 but the law otherwise
treats as equal all those who wish “to marry, establish a home
and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of
[their] own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges
long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit
of happiness by free men.”103 Like the Constitution, real
American baseline accommodationism does not require the law to
privilege the individual who wishes “to worship God according to
the dictates of his own conscience” and to discriminate in his
favor (via presumptions or otherwise) against the individual who
wishes “to marry, establish a home and bring up children.” What
this means is that to remain noncontroversial, baseline
accommodationism has to define its tipping points—”significant
costs or harms” and “undue interference”—automatically to
include competing constitutional rights, or it has to be revised
consistent with the majoritarian sense that “the state’s
interest . . . in prohibiting . . . discrimination overrides the
general commitment to accommodationism.”104

102. Coleman, Storming the Castle, supra note 41, at 421.
103. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); see also Obergefell v.
Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 2593, 2597–99 (2015) (holding that state laws banning
same-sex marriage violate the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses).
104. Levin et al., supra note 3, at 944.

